dr Richard Whitman

R.W. - The approach of the EU towards the Balkans is one of conditionality and compliance. If the EU sees conditions changing to favour the political and economic systems it favours it offers rewards. If there is no compliance there is no deepening of the relationship. However, in spite of what the

EU says I do not think that it actually has a common policy. The EU really wants two things. First, that there should be no fighting in the region - because it has no capacity to respond. Second that there should be changes of government in the region towards more liberal democratic political systems. However, it is doing very little to bring about the latter. Therefore it has not developed the means to implement the situation it would like to see - hence any real policy.

E+: When do you think the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of EU would function as single? Which government is now building the CFSP and which is going to be a leading one: German, British or French?

R.W. - I think that the CFSP will never be a single policy. What is important is that when EU states decide to act together they can make policy quickly, everybody keeps to the policy and that there are mechanisms to implement the policy. The EU states agree in foreign policy objectives in a great

number of areas - there are differences in style and presentation but on 'big' issues there are not many major disagreements. The primary problem for the EU is that it lacks the means to implement policy by the Member States collectively. There are 16 foreign ministries (15 states plus the Commission) involved in formulating a policy and then 16 foreign ministries often involved in implementing policy. In addition the EU lacks military strength to back-up its pronouncements. How can the EU really be taken seriously if all it can do is issue a statement, give some foreign aid or send a troika mission or 'monitor' a situation?

E+: Who is going to have a leading role in creating the CFSP: Germany, UK or France?

This is a very difficult question to answer. Let me explain why. We have to make a distinction between the architecture for the CFSP and its content. First on architecture. Germany and France have different visions for what kind of structure is needed to create a CFSP. For, the last German

Government - it is too early to say for the new one - the long-term desire was to create something like a single foreign policy and to subsume all national foreign policies into an EU foreign policy. For the French the vision is somewhat different. French Governments, past and present, have wanted to create and EU foreign policy but not at the cost of national foreign policy. That is the French still want to retain freedom of action for them. The question for the future of the CFSP is which one of these visions will be realised. On the content of foreign policy this differs across issue areas. Let us take two examples. The German position is for a strong Trans-Atlantic connection, and this is the majority view in the EU at present. The French position is for European-first solutions to

Problems, and therefore, perhaps, a weaker Trans-Atlantic relationship. A second example is the Middle East. The German position is to broadly to follow the lead of the USA. The French would like a stronger European presence and involvement in the region. The EU Member States are much more divided on this issue and, therefore, one might see a future choice between French and German positions.

E+ - In what way the Yugoslav policy towards former Yugoslav republics and Kosovo, in your opinion, has influenced the creation of single CFSP? And vice verse, in what way the EU policy towards Yugoslav crisis influenced the present state in Yugoslavia and the region?

R.W. - The conflict in the former Yugoslavia pre-dates the CFSP that only came into force in 1993 - and this was largely because EU states were really aware that they lacked a real foreign policy capacity from 1989 onwards. I would like to say that the EU 'learnt' from its experience in Yugoslavia

and decided to build a strong foreign policy. It has not done so and I think that this is the EU's greatest failure to date. I think that if the EU had created the means to create and implement a strong foreign policy in the late 1980s there would have been a very different situation arising in Yugoslavia. The problem that arose was that EU diplomacy lacked respect and a punch. In this situation how could it expect to have had any influence? However, this 'excuse' is not sufficient. Western Europeans failed to involve NATO earlier - mostly because they lacked confidence in their own

ability to persuade the US to be involved through NATO in 1991. I think that the same situation existed with respect to Kosovo - Western European’s have hoped for 10 years that they would not need to confront the situation there and that it would magically disappear. The EU has not applied the lessons it learnt on the break-up of Yugoslavia. I think that this is the fundamental mistake that Western Europe's political leaders have made in the late 20th century and historians will offer a very unfavourable verdict when they compare the determination to create single currency against that to create a foreign policy for the EU.

E+ - Do you think that the position of the EU as a second (third?) super-power will be undermined after the Euro become a single currency of the EU?

R.W. - On the contrary I think that the EU's power will be strengthened. At present the EU is a superpower in everything but its actions. The EU is the worlds largest trading bloc and the military expenditure of the 15 EU Member States is the second largest of any 'state' in the world - exceeded only by the United States. The Euro will become the second reserve currency - after the US dollar -and thereby the EU will have a monetary strength to match its trading power. The primary problem that the EU has is converting all of these capabilities into meaningful power that it uses to influence events. At present this does not happen and, therefore, Europe is a very strange superpower.

E+ - In what way the interests of the NATO and the EU confront (especially in Balkan), and how much it affects Yugoslavia?

R.W. - I think that NATO and the EU have a similar interest that is 'stability'. However, I think they define that condition differently. For NATO it is understood in military terms. For the EU it means, ultimately, that the Balkans becomes more like Western Europe in political and economic terms. However, the EU policy is one of hope for the long term. In the interim it seeks 'containment' of conflict which is also the NATO policy at this time.

E+ - What do You think about the latest Russian political moves (in economy, in internal and external policy) and the influence they will have on future Russian position as a super-power?

R.W. - Russia is clearly a significant power in Europe. Perhaps the greatest leverage that it currently has is its instability - this means that Western Europeans find Russia unpredictable. However, as with the Balkans I think that Western Europeans have no real strategy for relations with Russia. Western European Governments know that they do not want Russia to join the EU, or NATO, but have not yet agreed as to whether Russia must be treated as a good friend (but one who has many problems that must be accommodated), or that Russia can simply be ignored, or that it is a threat to the political stability of Europe and must therefore be treated accordingly. I think that one thing is certain, there is only one potential superpower in Europe and it is not Russia.

E+ - What do you thing on German position in the EU and globally?

R.W. -The real unknown factor in Europe at the moment is how the policy of the new German Government will evolve. The EU faces many tough challenges if it is to enlarge and Germany is a key player in getting these challenges (on financing, the Common Agricultural Policy, structural and regional aid) resolved. However, the new Government is still finding its feet. The most interesting question will be whether Germany views the EU as the best route for pursuing its foreign policy or whether it wishes to be more independent on the global scene - we have to wait and see!

E+ - Since you are a research-fellow at NATO, what is the position towards EU?

R.W. - At present the relationship between the EU and NATO is very underdeveloped. To take an example in December 1998 there was the first ever visit by the EU Presidency on the Secretary General of NATO! It is obvious that the memberships of the two organisations overlap but the formal connections between the two are underdeveloped. The place where there is the most intense contact is through the Western European Union (which is the putative defence arm of the EU and the European pillar of NATO) but only 10 EU Member States are members of the WEU.