South Eastern Europe 2000 - A View from Serbia

• Table of Contents
• Prospects for the Regional Cooperation of Nongovernmental Organizations in Southeastern Europe: A View from Serbia (a chapter from the book)
• SUMMARY: The Necessity of Yugoslavia's Integration into the Regional and European Structures

Contents

Introduction

RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMME - GUIDELINES AND DIVISION OF ROLES

1. Reconstruction and Development Programme for South Eastern Europe

Jelica Minic

2. Tre Region's International Policy and Security: A Changed Setting

Ranko Petkovic

INTEGRATION

3. Enlargement Policy of the European Union - The Place of South Eastern Europe

Branislava Alendar

4. Multilateral Cooperation in South Eastern Europe

Duško Lopandic

DEMOCRATIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS

5. Prospects for the Regional Cooperation of Nongovernmental Organizations in South Eastern Europe: A View from Serbia (given here with insignificant modifications)

Danijel Pantic

6. South Eastern Europe and Demographic Ethnocentrism

Srdjan Bogosavljevic

ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

7. Distortions in Trade Flows

Goran Cetinic

8. Consequences of War Destruction for the Yugoslav and Regional Transport Infrastructure

Olga Cvetanovic

9. Regional Development Based on the Establishment and Upgrading of Clusters

Predrag Jovanovic

SECURITY

10. Kosovo Determinants of Security in South Eastern Europe

Miroslav Hadžic

SUMMARY

11. The Necessity of Yugoslavia's Integration into the Regional and European Structures

Jelica Minic

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Prospects for the Regional Cooperation of Nongovernmental Organizations in Southeastern Europe: A View from Serbia

"(…) All those who are inclined to the destruction of liberty in a new, democratic nation should know that war is the safest means to serve their ends…"

(Alexis de Tocqueville)

"The principle that the end justifies the means is in individualist ethics regarded as the denial of all morals. In collectivist ethics it becomes necessarily the supreme rule…The most effective way of making everybody serve the single system of ends toward which social plan is directed is to make everybody believe in these ends…This is, of course, brought about by the various forms of propaganda…the skillful propagandist then has the power to mold their minds in any direction he chooses, and even the most intelligent and independent people cannot entirely escape that influence if they are long isolated from all other sources of information."

(Friedrich von Hayek)

1. Introduction and basic hypotheses

In this article I will be dealing with the concept and importance of cross-border third sector cooperation in southeastern Europe.

The contemporary social thought is faced with the upsurge of non-governmental, not-for-profit organizations. This phenomenon has spread into the countries of central and eastern Europe on the wave of newly acquired freedoms, after the fall of the Berlin Wall ten years ago. Nowadays, there is more than 50,000 such independent organizations in the region. During the communist rule, when the social values of enterprenuership and free association of citizens were suppressed, the nations of central and eastern Europe seized their chance to embark upon a new venture of freedom. At the same time, there was an increase in the level of social needs by the new social actors, as the dismantling of communist rule led to an upsurge of economic competition that in many ways resembled the early stages of liberal capitalism. The institutional vacuum that was thus created started to be gradually filled with a diversity of "new" social agents, i.e. third sector organizations - citizens' associations, foundations, endowments and think-tanks.

In its first years, the third sector in central and eastern Europe was supported and encouraged by the West. This has proven a fruitful approach that has enabled both a deepening and a broadening of the third sector. However, it has also brought some unwanted side-effects, such as an increased level of aid-dependence, and an unwanted degree of disloyal and illegitimate competition.

2. The political realities of the third sector in southeastern Europe

The major issues in the region’s particular countries, namely Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Greece, Macedonia and Romania, have been characterized by somewhat different developments as compared to central and eastern Europe as a whole.

From a historical point of view, events in southeastern Europe over the past ten years have unfolded at a much faster pace than those in most other parts of the world. The war over Kosovo, spanning eleven weeks from 24 March to 10 June 1999, has created a new set of difficult realities for the nascent third sector in FR Yugoslavia. This involved swift and massive forced migrations, and a destruction of the vital transportation and energy infrastructure by NATO in Serbia. Although it was clear well in advance (prior to 1998) that an eruption of inter-ethnic violence could occur in Kosovo at anytime, very little was done in terms of preventive diplomacy. However, positive political momentum has been achieved in the aftermath of the open conflict. With KFOR in place, it is hoped that a final pacification of the region will be achieved, placing it on the tracks of contemporary trends of modernization and gradual inclusion into the European supranational structures. This opportunity has been acknowledged by a number of think tanks, perhaps most notably by the Center for European Policy Studies, in its comprehensive and challenging policy paper: "A system for post-war South-East Europe" (Plan for reconstruction, openness, development and integration).¹

Still, there is a reluctance in the international political circles to move ahead substantially. There are indications that chance could be lost again. At the moment the western leaders, especially those of the US, the UK and France, seem to be in favor of a further isolation of Serbia until the regime in Belgrade is removed and a process of genuine democratization initiated. It seems that the effects of the international punishment of the Serbian people in the 1992-1995 period and later in 1998 have not been assessed properly. On the other hand, issues steaming high on the political agendas of the western governments in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict, such as alleged war crimes committed by the regime, followed by the indictment of five top Serbian officials, are pushing the western powers in the direction of further pressuring Serbia - an approach that has proven to be mostly contraproductive in the past.

Measures such as trade embargoes, bans on private investment, and on international financial assistance to FR Yugoslavia, tend to strike at the wrong target, namely the population and civil society, while offering to the regime a chance to cover up the consequences of its own misconduct (e.g. the hyperinflation in 1993), by excuses related to the "animosity of a part of the international community towards the Serbian nation". In other words, as was noted in the study recently released by the Belgrade-based economic think tank "G-17", "The regime has used sanctions as an alibi for all internal defeats and failures. It has always shrewdly manipulated with a natural hostility by the citizens against such an obvious international blackmail, to abuse their patriotism and incite nationalism. Faced with irrational problems of all kinds and ‘a global world conspiracy’, the citizens have not been given much time to think about low wages and other ‘down to earth’ economic tragedies."²

The social fabric of FRY, including its third sector, was largely left to itself between 1992 and 1995. This has again been the case since 1998. Isolation is helping the regime to entrench itself and develop a xenophobic ideology that it then disperses among the pauperized population by state controlled mass media.

Compared to the situation in the other southeastern European countries, the situation in Serbia looks rather grim. The process of transition has unfolded successfully in countries such as the Czech Republic or Poland, due to their gradual inclusion into the democratic world through a great process of social engineering that has healed social illnesses inherited from the communist system. While in other countries in transition western foundations and international development agencies have infused money and knowledge needed for reforms, Serbia has been systematically pushed into isolation. Kosovo after the 1999 bombing will create an exception to this policy, as it will be structured essentially as an international protectorate. This will lead to a complete reversal of the international policy, and a great influx of all sorts of aid.

Conversely, the lack of aid largely explains the weaknesses of the third sector in Serbia, which is being treated as a "trouble-pet" and a "basket-case". At least part of the problem is that the West too often deals with crises in southeastern Europe on ad-hoc basis. This lack of a clear strategy has only helped the local, obsolete ruling structures, to spread the virus of corruption in the region by shifting the economy to a structure run by Mafia-style "business elites".

It is almost a miracle that in this mostly negatively evolving environment third sector organizations have proven so resistant to jeopardy, and even offered new perspectives and a new, positive social vision.

In this respect, let us look at the third-sector organizations as an important tool for fostering the values of democracy. They foster the much needed tolerance and inter-ethnic understanding and empathy, the rule of law and sustainable development, via both bilateral and multilateral avenues of cross-border cooperation. This goes well along the lines of what has been happening in the global society, bearing in mind that NGOs are growing influential as advocates of social change world-wide.

There is an increased number of global success stories of campaigns led by the NGOs that have led to results such as the international ban on land mines production, or efforts to fight corruption through the establishment of regional and global mechanisms of increased transparency.³

3. The theoretical framework - concepts and categories

At this stage, one arrives at the issue of conceptual determination of the third sector and its component organizations in southeastern Europe, as well as the broader social context of their operation. I shall make an effort to build on the theoretical insight espoused by the John Hopkins University’s Institute for Policy Studies regarding a definition of the third sector.⁴

As far as the definition is concerned, an NGO bears a legal personality, it is established on a legal basis, and seeks no profit from its activity. I shall focus here mainly on public benefit organizations, as opposed to mutual benefit organizations. The former are much more important in the post-communist countries, where former regimes allowed and even fostered the work of a number of mutual benefit organizations (e.g. Fishermen and Beekeepers Associations, Sports Clubs, etc.), while restricting public benefit organizations, whose raison d’être would have been work aimed at effecting social changes.

A variety of the terminology has been used to depict the institutions that belong to the non-profit sector. Here are those most commonly found in the sources:

• "The charitable sector" is a term that emphasizes the support that the organizations it denotes receive from private, charities.

• "The independent sector" is a term that emphasizes the important role these organizations play as a "third sector", outside the realms of government and private business.

• "The voluntary sector" is a term that emphasizes the significant input that volunteers make to the management and operation of NGOs.

• "The tax-exempt sector" is a term that stresses the fact that under the tax laws of many countries NGOs are exempted from taxation.

• "Nongovernmental organizations" (NGOs) is a term used to depict the third sector organizations in the developing world and countries undergoing a transition from communism to democracy.

• "The non-profit sector" is the term preferred by the Anglo-American scholars who subscribe to a taxonomic approach to the classification of NGOs. This term implies that the organizations belonging to this sector do not exist primarily to generate taxable profits for their owners.

All of these definitions depict a part of the phenomenon of the third sector, although they fail to provide a comprehensive definition, mostly due to the highly diversified nature of the third sector organizations. While some of the definitions overlap, each depicts some of the essential features of the third sector. This partial accuracy is due to methodological considerations, as the above definitions strive to define the third sector as a residual category. Any careful observer, however, will notice that in southeastern Europe entities that belong to the third sector are extremely diverse, and that they considerably differ as they are depicted under the respective national legislation and tax codes on the one hand, and in the actual social practice, on the other. I would propose an inclusive definition. Third sector organizations are not-for-profit, non-governmental organizations, capable of independent pursuit of their mission. These organizations, being legal entities, are formed on the basis of a freely expressed will of freely associated citizens, and they are most frequently devoted to achieving social change that arises from a common set of values.

Such common values include: peace, democracy, protection of human and minority rights, sustainable development, and regional cooperation, among others. I am aware that this approach could come under fire from those who might regard such values as belonging to a pro-western paradigm. In a sense, this is true, as what is at stake here is that segment of the third sector in southeastern Europe that is mainly devoted to the effort of modernization of the respective societies, on the basis of values widely accepted as the universal legacy of a free mankind. This process implies a certain social engineering. Unfortunately, the emergent networks of civil society in countries such as FR Yugoslavia or Croatia have often been impeded by direct or indirect government interference (e.g. the recent take over of the B-92 Radio in Belgrade by the government, or the Croatian NGO Law and the government’s repressive use of the tax laws).

Another crucially important concept here is that of civil society, which is an aggregate term, encompassing a number of social communications and ties, institutions and social values, revolving around the concept of a free individual - the citizen and his or her vested human rights. A civil society encompasses citizens and citizens’ associations, where the citizen acts in a dual capacity: as an individual person, and as the "owner" of a number of rights inherent to a human being. The most important collective actors in a civil society are citizens’ associations, civil institutions, and social movements. Institutions directly linked to a civil society include the family, the church, charities, private foundations, universities and the school system in general, to the extent that they are independent from the government. This also includes free, autonomous media.

The cultural dimensions of civil society are equally important from the point of view of formation and dissemination of the fundamental cultural values and an appropriate type of political culture. This feature of civil society arises from the classic idea that one of the key dimensions of civil society is an ethical vision of social life.

This idea is complementary to the principle that civil society is based on citizens’ trust in societal institutions. It is not an issue of whether or not social and cultural considerations come before economics, politics, or anything else; rather, without a proper attention being paid to social and cultural considerations, engagement with economics, politics, legal systems, or other institutions is virtually pointless. Accordingly, the evaluation of any particular program must be focused not on the quantitative results of it, but rather on a qualitative assessment of how and to what extent the program has encouraged people to see, create, and embrace the opportunities for social and cultural development.

4.The social context of Serbia and the protagonists of civil society

A political perspective on the Yugoslav tragedy as a prototype of failure to successfully manage the process of transition may cast doubts over the compatibility of southeastern Europe with the European Union, in light of the EU’s expansion plans into the region. The 1990s FRY has been obsessed a forceful nation-building project, based on 19^th century paradigms, and drawing on the view that Serbs had been systematically victimized throughout their history, going back to the 1389 Battle of Kosovo. This obsessive project, spread through government-controlled mass media, has helped the Miloševic regime raise considerable public support and build a new legitimization base, unseen in the Yugoslav federation since Josip Broz Tito’s death.

On a number of crucial occasions, the Miloševic regime has proven totally insensitive to the values and policies of modern Europe. The national program that the government has pursued over the last ten years had been devised by a self-proclaimed intellectual elite, gathered in the conservative circles. This program implied the use of force with a view of redrawing the borders of ex-Yugoslav republics along ethnic lines. As a consequence, an almost complete destruction of the values of ethnic coexistence and economic development has occurred. The idea that people of different nationalities cannot live together has been promoted by mass media, which offered an ideological cover-up for ethnic cleansing. Within the ranks of the quasi-communist Serbian "intellectual elite", a strong anti-Yugoslav sentiment prevailed as early as 1989, leading to a widespread view that Serbs did not need the federation with the other nations of the former SFRY, if it was not to be structured according to their needs. That led to a situation where the federal structures were not used to preserve the state, but rather to wage war against other nations over territories. The other nations felt that their interests were being endangered, so they responded by nationalism, often equally brutal. A destructive ethnic nationalism ultimately prevailed in Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The idea that there existed a "final solution", a true panacea for all the problems of the respective ethnic groups, became firmly entrenched in most of them. Once poisoned by these ideas, most of the social energy of the ethnic communities was mobilized for the realization of ethnic emancipation projects. Nationalism thus started to help the ruling groups of the ethnic communities to reinvigorate their hold on power on a periodic basis.

In the aftermath of the Kosovo war, these energies remain highly potent, especially in the western Balkans. The same governments, and the same people, are still in power. The historical developments in Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia during the last ten years have created a Machiavelian absurd that can best be described as a phenomenon of the elites remaining in power by creating a theater of democratic institutions (a multi-party system, elections, a constitutional division of power) while in practice keeping a firm grip over the essential levers of power (the police and military, state-run media, public finance and foreign trade proceedings), and by avoiding any accountability. The elites have led the country into greater and greater catastrophes, wars and crises - circumstances in which it is much easier to manipulate the electorate and raise new energy and support from desperate social groups, often struggling for mere survival.

At the same time, the citizens in Serbia lack basic public goods, such as economic means, essential health services, and personal security. The third sector in Serbia has arisen largely as a reflection of the need to remedy these social ailments. This has been one of the main merits of the indigenous and authentic Yugoslav third sector in the 1990s. This has been especially so in the social context created after the Kosovo war. The country and its society have been left in ruins, isolated and impoverished. In reality, the international community is very hesitant to help, partly because it wishes to see the people suffering even more until they come to the point of enforcing the election of a new leadership. Some also believe that Serbs deserve more of what is seen as a "deserved" collective punishment for the atrocities that have been committed in their name. The casus beli, named as a "humanitarian intervention" (a contradictio in adiecto in itself) has now to be justified in the eyes of western electorates after their leaders have led a massive air campaign against FRY. How the prolonged and intensified isolation of Serbia, and an increased suffering of ever greater numbers of people, help apprehend and bring to justice those indicted for war crimes, restore democracy, and stabilize the region, remains entirely unclear.

On the other hand, it may be argued that one of the main reasons for the abortion of the process of modernization and the forceful dissolution of what was the former Yugoslav federation was a lack of democratic infrastructure, particularly at the grassroots level in local communities. A number of political groups have been installed or indirectly controlled by the regime. Others were tolerated as they consisted of liberal intellectuals incapable of seriously undermining the regime. The NGOs that could offer a genuine forum for the articulation of political interests of the citizens at the grassroots level, concerning concrete, down-to-earth issues, largely rose from the massive civil protests of 1996-7.

The level of development of the third sector in a society depends on several factors, exempli causa, on the available human capital, the dominant cultural values, the degree of development of philantrophy, and the accessibility of funding.

Because of the isolation and exclusion of Serbia from a majority of international networks, organizations, and institutions, the Serbian third sector is also excluded from many international programs and projects that support a renewal of the third sector in eastern Europe (the EU’s PHARE program, for example).⁵ This is also why the presence of the international third sector is visibly limited in Serbia. Many governments and global civil society networks are hesitant to become involved in Serbia. The chaotic economic and political situation, a hostile attitude of the government towards any international involvement, a legal vacuum and confusion, all additionally contribute to a limited and irregular presence of the international community in Serbia.

5. A description of the third sector in Serbia: Facts and figures

For the sake of methodological clarity and based on the available data, I shall try to describe the basic features of the third sector in Serbia, bearing in mind that there are no data available for Kosovo.⁶

It is difficult to discern numbers, types, and various roles of the Serbian third sector. The official statistics identifies only two vague groups: "social organizations" and "citizens’ associations", the majority of which are sports clubs, cultural and artistic organizations, humanitarian and charity associations, professional organizations, and such. There are approximately 20,000 such organizations in Serbia.

Table 1

Social organizations and citizens' associations in Serbia and Montenegro

The vast majority of these organizations belong to the so called "unreformed organizations". This means that they have been created and shaped by the communist regime. An only partially reformed political regime, and its converted communist party, still control, shape, and run most of the third sector in a traditional way. This is why in this paper I concentrate on a new and emerging third sector segment, which is truly autonomous from the government, and which deals with social crises by promoting social activism, social change, and by addressing new social issues, mobilizing various social groups, and offering a variety of new services. This segment is also a promoter of new ideas, value orientations, special interests, and alternative and critical thinking. According to the estimate of the Center for the Development of the Non-profit Sector, there were around 500 of those organizations in Serbia in 1998.⁷

Table 2

Division of NGOs according to field of activity

These organizations operate in various areas, such as: environment (23.4%), humanitarian aid (22%), local community development (14.8%), professional associations (12%), youth issues (9%), peace movements and human rights organizations (8.6%), education and research (5.5%), alternative cultural organizations (4.3%).

Graph 1

NGO Field of Activity

The mainstream third sector in Serbia is still unreformed, intransparent, and under-researched. Researchers prefer to study the emergent networks, but are reluctant to use international classifications of the third sector. They prefer the locally developed framework, which mainly reflects this new and "alternative" segment of the third sector. The following classification and evidence are based on the questionnaire prepared by the Center for the Development of the Non-Profit Sector.

Table 1 demonstrates just how broad the third sector is. It is difficult to identify the dominant roles of many organizations. A lot of them have two or three main roles. For example, the majority of anti-war organizations, created at the beginning of the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, in 1991, apart from working on conflict resolution and building a culture of tolerance, have in the meantime become involved in supporting refugees (financial aid, employment, etc.).⁸

However, in recent yeas, due to an increased level of competition, there has been a degree of specialization among the NGO community. The prolonged pressure by the regime on certain important spheres of civil society, such as the free media and universities, has led to an increased influx of high quality personnel into the third sector, which has been seen as an opportunity to preserve professional dignity.

One of the latest phenomena in Serbia is an increased number of government-organized NGOs. This tendency is gaining momentum, especially among those organizations that provide humanitarian assistance. The old thinking is applied again. Government- controlled NGOs (including the Yugoslav Red Cross) are exclusively entitled to import duty free humanitarian assistance goods, which are then often distributed in a manner imposed by the government. This "oligopoly" situation (a monopoly of the oligarchical structures) is inefficient and corrupt it restricts many self-help and mutual-assistance groups.

6. Networking the capacities to rethink southeastern Europe

In some countries of the region, such as in Bulgaria or Romania, the newly established third sector organizations have attracted talented, young people, especially in the niches such as public-policy research (think tanks) and the media. In addition, it seems that the role of local think tanks as islands of integrity and excellence is crucial in conceiving the future of the region. Too often, arrogance and poor understanding of the region in the circles of western policy-makers leads to improper policy choices being made.

Think tanks are able to provide the expertise and permanent surveillance of the developments in the government and business sectors. In addition, they have proven able to make invaluable breakthroughs in the direction of democracy and stability (e.g. the successful launching of the idea of primary elections in Bulgaria, amid stifling rivalries between democratic political leaders). An important feature of the work of think tanks is that they tend to be independent from the local power fabrics. Their research tends to be applied, and action oriented. Networked together, think tanks in southeastern Europe would be able to add considerable value to their services, facilitate a rational public debate, and offer fresh policy solutions. It would not take many resources in terms of time and funds to identify all think tanks in southeastern Europe and help them establish flexible and efficient mutual links.⁹ This is mush easier to do today, with modern computer technologies available as a means of communication, including the Internet and the multimedia CD-ROM databases. Think tanks from the region should also be linked with leading western institutions. An example may be found in the networking project "Europa South-East", based on the influential policy study entitled "Post war order for southeast Europe", coordinated by the Center for European Policy Studies in Brussels.

7. The European Union’s policy in southeastern Europe: The post-Kosovo situation

In May 1999, the European Commission issued a statement about the EU’s future relations with the countries of southeastern Europe. It confirmed "the readiness of the EU to draw the countries of this region closer to the perspective of a full integration into its structure" and specified that "this will be done through a new kind of contractual relationship, taking into account the individual situations of each country, including progress in regional co-operation" and providing a perspective of EU membership on the basis of the Amsterdam Treaty, once the criteria set out in Copenhagen have been met. The Commission paper proposed a new type of Stabilization and Association Agreements, which would be progressive, and take into account the objectives of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe and a future Common Strategy on the Western Balkans.¹⁰ One of the priority areas, as envisaged by the Commission, would be "democratization, civil society and institution- building". The primary objectives would be to:

• Contribute to the stability of the political structures of the countries concerned, which mainly means supporting free and fair elections and voter education, the development of parliamentary practices, legislative reform, and independent media;

• Safeguard the rule of law, with support to justice and the police, and also long- term initiatives for civic education in schools and the affirmation of multicultural values;

• Ensure the effectiveness of public administration, mainly through anti-corruption and training programs; and

• Ensure the viability of civil society, mainly by establishing a regional network of foundations for democracy.

It is envisaged that FRY will stay out of this scheme until it fulfils requirements that are obviously increasing in the aftermath of the Kosovo war. In the meantime, the EU will continue to differentiate between the two constituent republics of FRY ¾ Serbia being isolated and punished until it embarks upon a democratic path, and Montenegro being supported in a number of ways, as it’s government is considered pro-western and democratic.

The other recent, significant political initiative concerning southeastern Europe has been the launching of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe. The Pact was initiated by the German Presidency over the EU. The German-led plan recognized that a strategy to stabilize the region in the medium and long term must involve an effective process that will create conditions for a stable and peaceful development through democratization, increasing economic prosperity and strengthening of regional cooperation. The strengthening of civil society and taking particular account of the problems of minorities are also priorities.

Both approaches are undoubtedly needed, but their fruition and, even more importantly ¾ their effectiveness, will require a lasting political impetus and a substantial external financing, as well as an eventual inclusion of FRY in both initiatives.

There are many indications pointing to the ineffectiveness of the EU’s approach to the problems of southeastern Europe so far. This can be seen particularly well in the case of the Royaumont Process, which has been launched more than three years ago (13 December 1995) as an Initiative for Stability and Good Neighborliness in Southeastern Europe. It has had only 18 projects in its record, mainly in the domain of the free media. It took almost two years for the Coordinator of the Royaumont Process to be appointed (28 November 1999). The Royamount Process has now finally had a distinct budget line approved by the European Parliament, which will be transferred to the Common Foreign and Security Policy Budget this year, amounting to 2.8 million Euro. Bearing in mind the needs of the region and it’s accumulated problems, this amount is insignificant.

The academic community has also been increasingly focusing its attention on the EU-led long-term stabilization plans for the Balkans. At this point, I will try to offer a number of comments on the platform espoused in the CEPS paper, in its part devoted to a "European civil society" (point 2.5.):¹¹

"The EU has not yet allocated significant budgetary resources to vital pan-Balkan programs of cooperation in education and training in ‘civil society’ domains. In principle 5 million Euro has been allocated for such purposes to the "Royaumont Process for Good Neighborliness in South-East Europe". But this is not yet activated [it is expected that the EU institutions will soon resolve the question of how to give this budgetary provision a proper legal basis]."

This point illustrates the low level of effectiveness of European institutions when dealing with situations in southeastern Europe. This problems stems from the fact that Brussels deals with countries on a case-to-case basis, while not paying sufficient attention to general circumstances in the region.

"…Until now the EU has given priority in practice to bilateral programs of cooperation between it and individual countries of the region, with very limited possibilities for actions integrating the peoples of accession candidates with other countries of the region. In a new post-war political environment this policy should change. Such programs, for example for promoting civil society and educational objectives, are of very minor cost compared to the financial resources available to the EU. The issues are therefore ones of policy choice and management, rather than lack of money."

The total amount of the EC funds committed to the former Yugoslav republics (excluding Slovenia) and Albania in the period 1991- 9 amounts to 4.185 billion ECU. Most of these funds have been given to Bosnia and Herzegovina - 2.068 billion, and the least to FRY - 0.322 billion. Most of the EC assistance has gone into humanitarian aid (ECHO), totaling 1.9087 billion ECU.¹² The EU was responding to the humanitarian needs in the region as well as to the needs of the post-war reconstruction in Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina, but insufficient funds have been allocated to the development of the third sector in FR Yugoslavia.

"…To give a new impetus to the development of civil society in the whole of South-East Europe, and to avoid administrative congestion with too many projects at the Commission in Brussels, greater resources and reliance could be attributed to specialized foundations (i.e. separate legal entities, subject to EU policy directives, receiving PHARE funding from the EU budget). Two principle initiatives would thus be a South-East European Foundation for Democracy (SEFDEM) - there is already a proposal of this type, whose scope may be reconsidered in the post-war context; and a South-East European Foundation for Education (SEFED)."

This would indeed be a very welcome solution, hopefully allowing more flexibility in dealing with the needs of the region’s civil society and educational infrastructure. The mentioned foundations should be well equipped in terms of skilled personnel and communication capabilities, to be able to cope with the varying requirements of the region. It is of vital importance to pursue research into the existing needs of all of the respective countries, in order to define the most effective strategies and programs.

"… A new South-East European campus of the College of Europe should be established for post-graduate courses in contemporary European studies, following the extension of the Bruges College already to a campus at Natalin near Warsaw…"

This recommendation is of outmost importance. Such an institution should be created as soon as possible. As for FRY in the field of education, it is worth noting that students from Serbia and Montenegro have been excluded from all EU funded programs as part of the policy of punishing the regime in Belgrade. The only consequence of this measure has been a lack of knowledge of modern Europe among the youth, and an increased feeling of being expelled from the European mainstream. The country is simply going to have a deficit of new leaders, in addition to a large brain drain that has occurred during the last decade. The human capital needed for reforms is melting in the region, because of a brain drain caused by the lack of opportunities, and the isolation of southeastern Europe. In Serbia, certain breakthrough achievements by the NGO community have been recorded before the 1999 war in Kosovo, such as the joint project of Belgrade Open School and the European Movement in Serbia on the one side, and European University Institute’s Teaching Project, on the other, which enabled a group of Ph.D. students from Florence to teach in Belgrade.¹³

"…Administrative bottlenecks in Brussels can also be eased by granting decentralized responsibilities to the Commission Delegations in the region. Experience acquired in Central and Eastern Europe shows that substantial capacities can be built up quite rapidly, as long as there is flexibility in recruitment rules and then real decentralization of responsibilities, especially for managing micro-projects… This is especially valuable for people-related projects in the broad civil society area, where the essence often consists of spotting the individuals whose personal projects are worth backing, and then intervening fast to sustain motivation."

Very true. In addition that would certainly require a sufficient degree of coordination, in order to foster the formation of proper links among groups and individuals from different countries of the region.

8. Policy recommendations

8.1. Recommendations directed to the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Government of Serbia:

• Stop the repression of representatives of the civil society;

• Foster the creation of a favorable institutional setting for NGOs, including a new NGO law that would regulate their statutory position (including the process of registration) and clearly exempt these organizations from income taxation;

• Enable the local registration of branches of foreign NGOs;

• Accept NGOs as partners; introduce a special government agency that will foster the development of the third sector, based on the experiences of more advanced transition countries.

8.2. Policy recommendations to the Governments of southeastern Europe:

• Create a beneficial institutional framework for the growth of the third sector, by enacting new, reformed legislation;

• Establish proper tax incentives that will encourage corporate giving;

• Open public tenders to NGOs that have service delivering missions i.e. give them a chance to compete with government agencies that are providing social services for contracts financed via state-budgets;

• Consider the establishment of new institutions with the principal role of improving the neglected third sector and protecting civil rights, such as the Ombudsman and special advisors to the government.

8.3. Policy recommendations to western governments:

• Do not restrict international travel of the third sector representatives from the region;

• Help, by all possible means, the twining of organizations from the West and those from southeastern Europe;

• Help by all possible means the fostering of regional networks and joint projects by the organizations from southeastern Europe.

8.4. Policy recommendations to the supranational European organizations (the European Union, the Council of Europe), international development agencies and international financial institutions:

• Expand the programs intended for civil societies of southeastern European countries;

• Make the programs more effective, transparent and approachable by civil society organizations;

• Urgently make individual students, from all southeastern European countries, eligible for financial support for educational programs in western European countries;

• Launch new programs tailored to the region, along the lines of the needs articulated by southeastern European NGOs.

8.5. Policy recommendations to transnational NGOs:

• Include organizations from all countries of southeastern Europe in civil society networks;
• Provide southeastern European NGOs with logistics and technical help in upgrading their capacities;

• Devise and apply a twining strategy, in order to help the capacity building of NGOs in southeastern Europe.

• Help the transfer of know-how to NGOs in the region.

8.6. Policy recommendations to the local authorities of southeastern European countries:

• Devote due attention to the grassroots initiatives emanating from local NGOs;

• Be open to initiatives regarding the improvement of conditions for the building of civil society at the local level;

• Foster a partnership with NGOs in order to tackle local policy problems.

Literature:

1. "Commission communication to the Council and European Parliament on the stabilization and association process for countries of southeastern Europe", May 26, 1999, Brussels, COM (99) 235, DG IA.
2. "The European Union’s policy towards South-East Europe", paper presented by Fraser Cameron at the conference on "Developing a network of young leaders from southeastern Europe", Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Halki, Greece, June 1999.
3. Ruzica M. et al., "Serbian third sector at a crossroads: A bridge to Europe, a weak ‘Alternative’, or how to make it sustainable?", ISTR’s third international conference, (Geneva, July 8-11, 1998).
4. Pavlovic, V. (ed.), "Suppressed civil society", Collection of papers (in Serbian), Eco Centar, Belgrade, 1995.
5. Salamon, L. M. & Anheir, H. K.,"In search of the non-profit sector: The question of definitions", The John Hopkins University — Institute for Public Policy, Baltimore, March 1992, pp. 1–4.
6. G-17, Group of 17 Independent Economists, "Economic consequences of NATO bombing: Estimates of damage and finances required for the economic reconstruction of Yugoslavia ¾ A summary", June 1999.
7. "A system for post-war South-East Europe" (Plan for reconstruction, openness, development and integration), 3 May 1999, Brussels.
8. Petrovic B. et al., A directory of nongovernmental non-profit organizations in FR Yugoslavia, 2^nd and revised edition, Center for the Development of the Non-Profit Sector, Belgrade, 1997.
9. Synak, B. et al. (eds), "A Polish-American dialogue: Voluntary sector in a changing society", Indianopolis, 1996.
10. Ryan, W.P., "The new landscape for non-profits", Harvard Business Review, January 1999, pp. 127–36.

Notes:

1. Brussels, 3 May 1999
2. Economic consequences of NATO bombing: Estimates of damage and finances required for the economic reconstruction of Yugoslavia — A summary, June 1999
3. The work of Transparency International is often quoted as such a case. (See http://www.transparency.de). This international NGO is becoming actively involved in the SEE as well.
4. Salamon, L. M. & Anheir, H. K.,"In search of the nonprofit sector: The question of definitions", The John Hopkins University — Institute for Public Policy, Baltimore, March 1992, pp. 1–4.
5. Ruzica M. et al., "Serbian third sector at a crossroads: A bridge to Europe, a weak ‘Alternative’, or how to make it sustainable?", ISTR’s third international conference, (Geneva, July 8-11, 1998).
6. Ibid. pp. 4–6.
7. CRNPS, Belgrade.
8. Ibid. pp. 3–5.
9. Some attempts in this direction have been made by the Freedom House, whose regional office is based in Budapest. Freedom House has published a directory of think tanks in central and eastern Europe. However, this is not a comprehensive publication, as it lacks data on FR Yugoslavia.
10. "The European Union’s policy towards South-East Europe", paper presented by F raser Cameron, the conference on ‘Developing a network of young leaders from southeastern Europe’, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Halki, Greece, June 1999.
11. CEPS, "A System for Post-War South-East Europe", pp. 12–3, Brussels, May 1999.
12. All figures are taken from the "Commission communication to the Council and European Parliament on the stabilization and association process for countries of South-Eastern Europe", Brussels May 26, 1999, COM (99) 235, DG IA.
13. The project has been highly evaluated both by students and lecturers.

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SUMMARY
The Necessity of Yugoslavia's Integration into the Regional and European Structures

1. Introduction

1. Both in the international community and the countries of South Eastern Europe the future of the region is increasingly viewed as indivisible, requiring a solution which all the parties concerned should jointly strive to achieve. If the region is to pull itself out of a ten-year period of tensions and conflicts, a sort of a Marshall plan for the post-war reconstruction of the formerly Yugoslav republics and their neighbors appears necessary. The European Union has offered a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe covering the political, security and development aspects. The Pact envisages a package of considerable financial and technical assistance to all the countries of the region affected by war destruction, but also to those who have sustained huge consequential economic damage, as the result of it. Unless the problems of security, political stabilization of the region, sanctions and protectionist policies in the economies of South Eastern Europe are resolved, a meaningful inflow of foreign capital cannot be expected as a precondition for an accelerated recovery and development of backward economies.

2. In the absence of an overall international programme that would enable Yugoslavia to join the development of market economies and democratic societies in South Eastern Europe, the devastated country will remain a hotbed of crises and instability, continuously threatening to sprout new conflicts in the region. The proportions of the conflict in Kosovo and the consequences of the NATO intervention will substantially influence the change in the security, political, economic, social and demographic picture of the region as well as the future place and role of Yugoslavia in it.

3. The distorted trade flows and disruptions in the railway, road, river, maritime and air traffics across and with Yugoslavia have created serious financial difficulties for the neighboring countries. In Macedonia and Republika Srpska, tens of thousands of workers lost their jobs due these countries' strong orientation towards the Yugoslav market. Interrupted transport will also seriously affect some of the Central European countries as well as the Commonwealth of Independent States. The destruction of infrastructure and industrial facilities in Yugoslavia threatens the whole region and seriously impairs the years long economic ties with Germany, Italy and other countries of the EU. These countries have considerable investments in the states established on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. However, the tensions and conflicts continuing for the past ten years along with the international isolation of the FRY have seriously disrupted or truncated the once developed commercial and technological ties, with uncertain prospects of their renewal or normalization in due course.

4. Yugoslavia is today, with an occasional exception of Montenegro and Kosovo, excluded from the negotiation of specific forms of cooperation shaping the future of South Eastern Europe. The starting position of Yugoslavia in the expected programme for the reconstruction and development of the region is highly inadequate. In addition to the inherited structural and macroeconomic imbalances, the Yugoslav economy has been gravely set back by the loss of the former SFRY market, the war and international sanctions. Yugoslavia is the only country in the region where the process of transition has not started as yet. Its economic activity is increasingly exposed to the pressures of government administration and ever more difficult conditions for entering the international market. The gray economy is the only segment of life which has marked considerable expansion. Finally, the conflicts in Kosovo and the NATO intervention brought about an unseen destruction of the public wealth, economic resources and human lives, causing a mass exodus of the population from Kosovo and increasingly so from other parts of the country.

5. Despite the fact that the market of the FRY is half the size of the one once shared by the former Yugoslav republics in their common state, it still ranks as one of the largest in the region. In a similar way, Yugoslavia has a central transit position. That is why the majority of regional problems will be impossible to deal with without Yugoslavia's involvement and cooperation. Its role will inevitably be of key importance in the post-war reconstruction effort and the economic revival of the region.

6. The priorities of Yugoslavia's reconstruction will differ from those of other countries in the region. Due to the scale of destruction, they will resemble those for the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina the most. In addition to solving the most urgent humanitarian problems, the major tasks will include the creation of conditions for the return of refugees and the reconstruction of infrastructure and physical capital. The works on the infrastructure (electric power system, water supply, transport infrastructure, river purification) will alone require dozens of billions of dollars. In addition, it is necessary to initiate the process of transition to the market economy based on private ownership. War operations destroyed the military industry of the country thus making the conversion to production for civilian purposes the only possible solution.

7. Considerable international technical and financial assistance will be needed to achieve a satisfactory degree of macroeconomic stability if the process of reconstruction and economic reforms is to be possible at all. In the first stage, primarily public assistance of international institutions may be expected (EU, IMF, World Bank, EIB, EBRD) to launch the reconstruction, to be followed by international private capital some time later. The bulk of future foreign investments will be directed towards private enterprises which will, at least initially, have to rely primarily on their own resources, as well as on the restructured banking system, various kinds of specialized services and technical assistance. There are also announcements that public investments in infrastructure will take the form of joint stocks of the relevant international financial institutions.

8. Yugoslavia is the only country of the region which has no agreements with the European Union, either as an East European or a Mediterranean country. The strategic interest of Yugoslavia is to join the EU, both in order to obtain easier access to the most important market in the world and to solve the internal needs of developing the market economy and a stable democratic society. In addition, that is the only way for all the countries of South East Europe, under the EU auspices, to completely liberalize the flows of international trade and capital, to reconstruct and develop their own infrastructure and, by embracing the European legal and institutional frameworks, promote their competitive position in the economy of the continent and beyond. The European option of Yugoslavia would enable the normalization and revival of broken ties as well as the intensification of the existing economic links with the former Yugoslav republics, which, on the eve of the disintegration of the country, accounted for about two thirds of overall trade outside individual republics. The liberalization of cooperation with the neighboring and Mediterranean countries is a natural course to take in preparation for the highly competitive West European and world markets.

9. Yugoslavia is the central country of South Eastern Europe through which the shortest, fastest and the cheapest main roads run. The Danube is a natural link of the countries of Central Europe and the most developed industrial basins of Western Europe to the area of the Middle East. The Budapest-Belgrade-Bar railway line is a connection of Central and Eastern Europe with the Mediterranean. The highway connected the Western, Central and Eastern Europe with Greece, Turkey and the countries of the Near East. Yugoslavia is, at the same time, a natural crossroads of major telecommunication lines among these groups of countries. The war-caused destruction in Yugoslavia is, and will continue to be, a source of major damage to all who used the above-mentioned transportation routes. That is why the rapid reconstruction of infrastructure in Yugoslavia is not only the national and regional interest but also a requirement of primary importance for numerous Central and West European countries.

10. An accelerated incorporation of Yugoslavia into European integration processes (free trade zone, link to the Euro, legal and institutional adjustment, association) along with the regional programme of reconstruction, would enable this country to become an economically prosperous link indispensable in regional cooperation and the cooperation of the EU with South Eastern Europe. Substantial internal changes are a precondition for the political solution of the Kosovo conflict and the prompt implementation of the reconstruction programme.

2. The role of the international community in the reconstruction programme of South Eastern Europe

11. The Balkan peoples, or the peoples of South Eastern Europe - the notion which the complex Balkan identity should presumably fit - have not been historically unaware of the solution After many conflicts and wars, which had been largely externally incited, the solutions for peace also came as a result of external mediation and pressures. Even the latest Balkan wars and their resolution are a part of a much larger "chessboard" of the world politics. The acts of internal actors and their policies were the replicas of processes developing in a broader milieu. The same is the case today. At this point of time, there is a clear and undivided political will in the international environment to find a solution. Such a will is being increasingly articulated both in the region and in the very cockpit of the crisis - Serbia. Barring the appearance of counter-pressures, a period of calm will set in, and perhaps even a permanent solution, if the integration of the Balkans into Europe proves successful.

12. Without abundant external assistance and international integration (regional and European as well as integration into the world market and international institutions) there can be no future for South Eastern Europe. The solution for Western Europe after World War II was also found in mutual reconciliation and integration. An important, and maybe even decisive role in the articulation and institutionalization of the European cooperation was played by the American political and economic support. The European Union has in South Eastern Europe today, taken this role, with the American assistance and Russian support. Such a strategic harmony of the main international actors in the region provides a unique chance for the countries of South Eastern Europe and acts as a strong external pressure to solve the internal political situation in the FRY.

13. The programme of the post-war recovery of South Eastern Europe aims at creating viable and stable economies and societies. The regional and European integrations should serve as the main lever for the switchover, while economic assistance and support to the reinforcement of the civil society and peace-time organization of the military and police forces in the region are the main instruments of stabilization and inception of a sustainable growth. The establishment of societies dependent on foreign assistance is neither in the interest of the countries of the region nor the EU and other donors. The EU needs vital economies and stable societies which will not weigh down or obstruct the integration processes in Europe.

14. The priority of international donors should be the development of institutions and horizontal networks in the region (infrastructure associations, cooperation of customs, police and judiciary bodies and local communities, cross-border links, partnership in business, NGOs, the media, etc.).

15. Particularly important is education at all levels and in all fields (institutional building, entrepreneurship, the young and women). Education of women has a decisive role for their equal engagement in the processes of stabilization and development of the region and a more even demographic growth.

16. Procedures for the accession of the countries of the region to the EU should be accelerated and they should be prepared for partnership relationships and the respect of legal and institutional frameworks resulting therefrom. Internal and external liberalization will be a shock for the economies and societies of South Eastern Europe, but this shock will have remedial effects. The West European countries which, fifty years ago, underwent these same processes themselves should be the mainstays of support, rather than instigators of divisions and conflicts. This particularly applies to Germany and Italy, as the principal economic partners of South East European countries.

17. Urgent and selective involvement of the actors of change in the FRY in all the processes and structures related to the application of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe would substantially accelerate the internal changes and help them prepare for a possible subsequent full participation and institutionalization of relations both in the region and with the EU.

3. Creation of the regional market - The role of regional actors

18. The Countries of the region are mainly small and economically weak. However, a regional market of about 70 million (around 130 million including Turkey), is a proper challenge not only for the regional and European firms. The problems lie in legal protection, the multitude of different administrative procedures, a large number of currencies, numerous tariff and non-tariff barriers and inadequate training of local partners (firms and states) to conduct businesses on the European and world markets. The bulk of the burden of changing the circumstances rests on the shoulders of the countries of the region, but without a systematic, co-ordinated and abundant foreign assistance the systemic changes would be politically unsustainable.

19. Although the strengthening of regional cooperation, specially the mutual liberalization of trade and transport, are viewed upon as a matter of long-term interest, aspirations are aimed at integration into the EU. Small and poor markets, the history of belonging to various empires and blocks, and hence weak economic ties, as well as the latest mutual conflicts and squabbles, all account for the Balkan countries' reservations to a stronger mutual integration. Regional linking has not aroused much enthusiasm even in the countries of Central Europe which are more developed, which received a far greater amount of assistance and are closer to the accession to the EU. Nevertheless, certain economic, and particularly political, results have been achieved. Taking into consideration the situation in South East European economies, it appears that the primary purpose of the regional economic association is a political rapprochement and preparation for association with and accession to the EU. Economic objectives are necessarily modest. But, the greatest gain will be reflected in the culture of cooperation developed with one's neighbors. Although the development of regional cooperation is a precondition for joining the EU, it is only within its framework that the real integration of South Eastern Europe will be possible.

20. An absolute priority in the renewal of physical capital in the region is accorded to the regional transport infrastructure and its fitting into the Trans-European infrastructure networks. Transport services and infrastructure in the region, underdeveloped as they were, suffered a heavy blow during the NATO intervention when many routes were broken and the flows of goods diverted away from the region. The reconstruction of electric energy systems and networks is not only a precondition for the implementation of all other reconstruction projects but also a humanitarian issue of primary importance. Prerequisites for successful business operation also include the regional telecommunications network, etc. South Eastern Europe should become a huge building site where the firms from the region, above all, will be given the chance, but also construction firms from other European countries thus contributing to the revival of many sectors of the European industry.

21. It is imperative that the private sector should have a leading role in the establishment and development of new economic structures, mindful of small- and medium-sized firms which are the quickest in adjusting to the market changes. The future of the region is not in extensive industrialization but in the development of services, processing capacities and flexible clusters based on local resources, know-how and tradition. The regional policy, structural funds and the opening of the EU market for agricultural products from the region may provide long-term support to such a policy.

22. The struggle against terrorism, illegal trade in arms and narcotic drugs, crime and corruption is in the interest of not only the countries of the region but also of the EU and other European countries and requires the engagement of all relevant European and international organizations, to prevent the region from turning into a centre of crime endangering the stability of Europe.

23. The institutionalization of regional cooperation will develop with greater speed through horizontal links and project approach than on a bilateral basis. For that reason, the reinforcement of local actors and administrative capacities should be secured to support these forms of cooperation, with appropriate assistance of the Western governments, foundations and international organizations. Non-governmental organizations and other actors of the civil society will have the role of initiators, transmitters, educators and controllers of these processes and should be supported to the largest possible extent.

4. The necessity of Yugoslavia's involvement

24. Yugoslavia may not remain an isolated island outside the integration processes in the region and in Europe. The Yugoslav authorities have to fulfil the requirements for putting an end to the international isolation of the country and must assume the responsibilities implied by joining the international organizations and institutions. To make this possible, the policy of threatening one's neighbors and committing war crimes in the name of national interests must be abandoned. The real national interests of Serbia and Yugoslavia are the economic, social and cultural development,which cannot be achieved without international cooperation and open frontiers.

25. Repression against the representatives of the civil society (independent media, trade unions, non-governmental organizations, and political opposition) must be stopped at once to enable the free action and interest-based association of citizens. The development and consolidation of the civil society necessitate manifold assistance from the international environment - information, education, communications, partnership and financial support.

26. The demilitarization of the society and civil control of the military sector are the prerequisites for civil peace and good neighborly relations. The region as a whole has high military expenditures which are a burden for the national budgets and work in favor of the militarization of poor societies. The military industry of Yugoslavia has been largely destroyed during the NATO intervention, while the military forces had to be reduced under the Dayton Agreement. The modernization of the army requires a high level of international cooperation and membership in relevant organizations and institutions that can guarantee the country's security.

27. The future of the region of South Eastern Europe depends on the solution of the Yugoslav crisis to a large extent. The EU could not allow its common foreign and security policies to be compromised faced with the first major challenge. Such a failure might have serious consequences for the entire European structure which has been built by generations for half a century already. That is precisely why the full involvement of Yugoslavia in the programme of post-war reconstruction of South Eastern Europe must be secured. That programme is at the same time the one of consolidation of the complex internal set-up of Europe itself. For that very reason, the project of joining Yugoslavia to the European structures must succeed. It represents a meeting of two political wills and a meeting of interests - the internal need for reforms and the opening of the country and the European need for the stabilization and integration of the South Eastern part of the continent.

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